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The United States is entirely a creature of the Constitution. Its 
power and authority have no other source. It can only act in 
accordance with all the limitations imposed by the 
Constitution. When the Government reaches out to punish a 
citizen who is abroad, the shield which the Bill of Rights and 
other parts of the Constitution provide to protect his life and 
liberty should not be stripped away just because he happens 
to be in another land. This is not a novel concept. To the 




Donald Vance and Nathan Ertel are American citizens who 
worked as private defense contractors in Iraq beginning in 2005 after 
                                                 
* J.D. candidate, May 2013, Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute 
of Technology; CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW executive articles editor, 2012–13; 
B.A., 2008, Drake University. 
1
  Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1957) (holding that the military could not 
constitutionally extend its court-martial jurisdiction to non-military civilians 
overseas). 
1
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the United States’ invasion.
2
 In April of 2006, they were detained by 
the United States military, based on suspicions they were helping their 
employer supply weapons to Iraqi insurgent groups.
3
 Vance and Ertel 
were, in fact, covertly working with the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation, voluntarily gathering information concerning the alleged 
misdeeds of their employer.
4
 Vance and Ertel alleged that during their 
detainment, they were subjected to “threats of violence and actual 
violence, sleep deprivation and alteration, extremes of temperature, 
extremes of sound, light manipulation, threats of indefinite detention, 
denial of food, denial of water, denial of needed medical care, yelling, 
prolonged solitary confinement, incommunicado detention, falsified 
allegations and other psychologically-disruptive and injurious 
techniques.”
5
 After it was determined they posed no threat, Vance and 
Ertel were cleared for release; however, they were still held in solitary 
confinement by the military for another 18 and 52 days, respectively.
6
 
Upon their return to the United States, the pair filed suit against then-
Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and other military officials, 
alleging that the detainment and torture they experienced were 
violations of the United States Constitution. However, their sought 
remedy—money damages—was not authorized by any federal statute.
7
 
The Supreme Court has long held that federal courts have both the 
authority and the duty to craft judicial remedies to ensure that 
violations of federally protected rights are redressed, even in the 
absence of statutory authority to do so.
8
 These remedies—creations of 
federal common law—are referred to as Bivens remedies, named after 
                                                 
2
  Vance v. Rumsfeld, 701 F.3d 193, 195-96 (7th Cir. 2012) (en banc), cert. 
denied  No. 12-976, 2013 WL 488898 (U.S. June 10, 2013) [hereinafter “Vance 
III”]. 
3
  Id. at 196. 
4
  Id. 
5
  Id.  
6
  Id.  
7
  Id. at 198. 
8
  See Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678 (1946) (“where federally protected rights 
have been invaded, it has been the rule from the beginning that courts will be alert to 
adjust their remedies so as to grant the necessary relief”). 
2
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the Supreme Court decision from which they originated.
9
 Both the 
district court and a three-judge panel of the Seventh Circuit Court of 
Appeals determined that Vance and Ertel’s lawsuit could potentially 
allow for the awarding of money damages under Bivens.
10
 A comment 
previously published in this Seventh Circuit Review disagreed with 
these decisions.
11
 However, the case was reheard en banc by the full 
Seventh Circuit, and the lower court decisions were reversed and 
vacated.
12
 The en banc majority posed the question as “whether to 
create an extra-statutory right of action for damages against military 
personnel who mistreat detainees,”
13
 and determined that both 
Supreme Court precedent and respect for the military in matters of 
national security foreclosed a Bivens remedy in such circumstances.
14
 
A petition for writ of certiorari was filed on February 5, 2013, but was 
denied on June 10, 2013.
15
 
This Note argues that the Seventh Circuit en banc decision 
dismissing Vance and Ertel’s complaint not only mischaracterized the 
relevant Bivens case law, but also abandoned the crucial role of the 
federal courts as guardians of constitutional rights in times of war. Part 
I of this Note details the underlying facts of Vance v. Rumsfeld as 
derived from the complaint—which the Seventh Circuit was obligated 
to accept as true
16
—to fully demonstrate the egregiousness of the 
                                                 
9
  Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 
403 U.S. 388 (1971). 
10
  Vance v. Rumsfeld, 694 F.Supp.2d 957 (N.D. Ill. 2010) [hereinafter 
“Vance I”], aff’d, 653 F.3d 591 (7th Cir. 2011) [hereinafter “Vance II”], vacated and 
rev’d, Vance III, 701 F.3d at 195-96.  
11  See John Auchter, Big Boy Rules, or How I Learned to Stop Worrying and 
Love “Special Factors,” 7 SEVENTH CIRCUIT REV. 1 (2011), at 
http://www.kentlaw.edu /7cr/v7-1/auchter.pdf (arguing that Congress, not the courts, 
is the proper forum for determining whether Bivens remedies are available for 
plaintiffs whose constitutional rights are violated in a warzone). 
12
  Vance III, 701 F.3d at 205. 
13
  Id. at 198 (emphasis added).  
14
  Id. at 199-200.  
15
  Vance v. Rumsfeld, No. 12-976, 2013 WL 488898 (U.S. June 10, 2013). 
16
  .Vance III, 701 F.3d at 196.  
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alleged conduct. Part II summarizes the history and progression of 
Bivens jurisprudence, placing particular emphasis on the cases 
involving allegations of misconduct by military officials. Part III 
returns to the Vance litigation, summarizing all three opinions and 
their treatment of the applicability of Bivens. Part IV then analyzes the 
en banc majority opinion and argues the decision errs in three major 
respects: (1) the court improperly interpreted Bivens precedent 
involving military plaintiffs to preclude Vance and Ertel’s claim 
despite their status as non-military civilians; (2) the court’s decision 
disregards the significance of qualified immunity, which already 
shelters government officials from suit so long as they execute their 
duties in good faith; and (3) the court was reluctant to scrutinize 
alleged violations of civil liberties during times of war, punting such 
scrutiny to other branches of government as a matter of “national 
security.” Such scrutiny is particularly crucial in situations such as 





I. THE FACTS 
 
After the United States’ invasion of Iraq in 2004, Donald Vance, a 
Chicago native and veteran of the United States Navy, began working 
as a security consultant for Shield Group Security (“SGS”), an Iraqi 
security company in Baghdad.
18
 Nathan Ertel, a Virginia native, was 
also hired by SGS to work in Baghdad as a contract manager.
19
 During 
their employment, Vance and Ertel observed allegedly corrupt 
payments “being made by SGS agents to certain Iraqi sheikhs.”
20
 In 
October 2005, while in Chicago, Vance informed the FBI of the 
strange observed activities taking place at SGS, and upon his return to 
                                                 
17
  Id. at 211 (Hamilton, J. dissenting). 
18
  Second Amended Complaint at 8-10, Vance I, 694 F.Supp.2d 957 (N.D. 
Ill. 2010) (No. 06-CV-06964) [hereinafter “Complaint”]. 
19
  Id.  
20
  Id. at 11. 
4
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Iraq began gathering such information as an informant for the FBI.
21
 
Ertel assisted Vance in gathering this information.
22
 As their 
undercover efforts progressed, so did the number of observed 
improprieties, expanding to SGS’ “dealings with the Iraqi government, 
other companies and contractors, and the sheiks . . . as well as on high-
level officials in the Iraqi government.”
23
 Notably, Vance and Ertel 
provided the FBI with information regarding their supervisor at SGS 
who was allegedly running a “Beer for Bullets” program, in which he 
would sell liquor to American soldiers in exchange for weapons and 
ammunition, which SGS would then sell for a profit.
24
 This practice 
led to SGS possessing an “unnecessary and alarming” stockpile of 
weapons.
25
 Vance became suspicious that SGS was supplying weapons 
to the United States’ enemies in Iraq.
26
 
Vance and Ertel alleged that on an unspecified date, a “high-
ranking” SGS employee confiscated both men’s Common Access 
Cards, leading the two men to believe that their cover had been blown.  
These cards were their Department of Defense issued identification 
badges, which allowed them to freely move about the military 
compound and other United States properties in Iraq.
27
 This 
confiscation in effect trapped the two inside the SGS compound.
28
 
Vance called their FBI contacts in the United States, who said they 
should consider themselves hostages and advised the two to barricade 
themselves inside their room with weapons until they could be rescued 
by the military.
29
 They were in fact rescued, upon which Vance and 
Ertel were transported to the United States Embassy.
30
 They were then 
                                                 
21
  Id. at 11-12. 
22
  Id. at 12. 
23
  Id. 
24
  Id. at 19-20. 
25
  Id. at 20. 
26
  Vance III, 701 F.3d 193, 196 (7th Cir. 2012). 
27
  Complaint, supra note 18, at 23. 
28
  Id. at 24. 
29
  Id. at 25. 
30
  Id. at 25. 
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questioned by United States officials, to whom they explained their 




After their questioning and a few hours of sleep, Vance and Ertel 
were suddenly awoken by armed guards, placed under arrest, and 
taken to an unknown United States military compound in Iraq  
(believed to be Camp Prosperity), where they were placed in a cage, 
strip-searched, and given jumpsuits.
32
 They remained there for 
approximately two days, where they were held in separate, perpetually 
lit solitary confinement cells and fed twice per day.
33
 After two days 
they were shackled, blindfolded, and transported to Camp Cropper, 
where they were again placed in solitary confinement in cold, cramped 
cells that had “bugs and feces” on the walls.
34
 The lights were always 
on, and the cells were filled with music “at intolerably-loud volume;” 
if they fell asleep they were awoken by guards.
35
 They were “often 
denied food and water completely, sometimes for an entire day.”
36
 
They were also denied treatment for basic medical care and hygiene.
37
 
For example, Vance continually requested aid for a severe toothache; 
the tooth was eventually pulled in a “hurriedly and covertly” 




For a week, Vance and Ertel were not allowed to go outdoors at 
any time; guards “constantly threatened” the use of “excessive force” 
if they did not “immediately and correctly comply with every 
instruction given them.”
39
 They were also not allowed any contact 
                                                 
31
  Id. at 25-26. 
32
  Id. at 28. 
33
  Id. at 28-29. 
34
  Id. at 29. 
35
  Id. at 30. 
36
  Id. 
37
  Id. 
38
  Id. at 30-31. 
39
  Id. at 31. 
6
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with the outside world for several weeks.
40
 While at Camp Cropper 
they were continually interrogated regarding their knowledge of the 
inner-workings of SGS, and were repeatedly threatened that they 
would “never be allowed to leave” if they did not properly comply.
41
 
At all times they were denied legal counsel.
42
 
Eventually both Vance and Ertel were informed there would be a 
proceeding before a “Detainee Status Board” to determine their status 
as either “enemy combatants,” “security internees,” or “innocent 
civilians.”
43
 Shortly thereafter, they were told they had been initially 
classified as “security internees” because of their “work for a business 
entity that possessed one or more large weapons caches on its 
premises and may be involved in possible distribution of these 
weapons to insurgent/terrorist groups”—precisely the activities the 
two had been reporting to the FBI.
44
 Both Vance and Ertel were 
provided with an opportunity to defend themselves of such accusations 
before the Detainee Status Board, albeit without access to requested 
evidence; the right to counsel; the right to call witnesses, including 
each other; the right to see the evidence against them; the right to 
remain silent; or the right to cross-examine adverse witnesses.
45
 At the 
end of the proceedings, both were returned to solitary confinement to 
await the Board’s findings.
46
 
After about one month following the hearing, Ertel’s release was 
authorized, though his actual release occurred eighteen days later.
47
 He 
was put on a bus to the Baghdad airport without any necessary 
documentation to leave Iraq.
48
 He was only able to leave after 
encountering a friend at the airport who arranged his departure through 
                                                 
40
  Id. at 32. 
41
  Id. at 33-35. 
42
  Id. at 33. 
43
  Id. at 35. 
44
  Id. at 35-36. 
45
  Id. at 38. 
46
  Id. at 42. 
47
  Id. 
48
  Id. 
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the U.S. Air Force.
49
 Vance was held for an additional two months 
after Ertel’s release, and his interrogations continued.
50
 He too was 
eventually dropped off at the Baghdad airport without any 
documentation to return to the United States.
51
 He eventually secured 
a flight home on his own.
52
 





II. THE LAW: BIVENS AND IMPLIED CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS 
 
Upon their return to the United States, Vance and Ertel sued 
former Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld in his individual 
capacity, as well as a number of unidentified defendants at Camp 
Cropper whose identities were unknown, seeking money damages.
54
 
However, there is no federal statute that provides a remedy of money 
damages for the alleged conduct.
55
 While Congress has passed 
legislation that authorizes federal courts to grant monetary relief for 
violations of constitutional rights by state and local officials 
(commonly referred to by its placement in the U.S. Code as “Section 
1983”),
56
 there is no analogous statutory provision that allows such 
suits against federal officers. The origins of Section 1983 date back to 
Reconstruction, providing a private enforcement mechanism to 
vindicate many of the newly guaranteed rights granted by the Civil 
                                                 
49
  Id. 
50
  Id. 
51
  Id. at 43. 
52
  Id. 
53
  Id. 
54
  Vance II, 653 F.3d 591, 598, fn. 4 (7th Cir. 2011). 
55
  Vance III, 701 F.3d 193, 198 (7th Cir. 2012). 
56
  See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006) (“Every person who, under color of any 
statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State . . . subjects, or causes 
to be subjected, any citizen of the United States . . . the deprivation of any rights, 
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the 
party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for 
redress[.]”). 
8
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War Amendments and civil rights acts.
57
 Section 1983 was “an 
important part of the basic alteration in our federal system wrought in 
the Reconstruction era . . .  [that clearly established] the role of the 
Federal Government as a guarantor of basic federal rights against state 
power[.]”
58
 Congress’ decision not to include federal officials within 
the scope of Section 1983 raises numerous questions about the 




With that said, federal courts have in the past found it proper to 
create causes of action and award relief even in the absence of explicit 
statutory authority. For example, the Supreme Court has previously 
held that courts may imply private rights from federal statutes if such 
rights are necessary to accomplish Congressional intent, although the 
Court in recent decades has admittedly retreated from this approach.
60
 
Additionally, in the context of constitutional violations, federal courts 
                                                 
57
  Michael G. Collins, “Economic Rights,” Implied Constitutional Actions, 
and the Scope of Section 1983, 77 GEO.L.J. 1493, 1497 (1989). 
58
  Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 238-39 (1972). 
59
  RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., ET. AL., HART AND WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL 
COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 733 (6th ed., 2009). 
60
  The Court first adopted a broad approach embracing implied rights of 
action if such a right would be “necessary to make effective the congressional 
purpose” of the statute. See J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 433 (1964) 
(implying a private cause of action under § 14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 
1934). The Court would later mandate a more detailed inquiry into Congressional 
intent before implying a private right of action by creating a restrictive four-factor 
test. See Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 78 (1975). But even with this new restrictive test 
in place, the Court still found a private cause of action when necessary to effectuate 
a statute’s objective. See Cannon v. Univ. of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677 (1979) (creating 
a private right of action under Title IX of the Educational Amendments of 1972). 
The modern approach, however, is that private rights of action may be implied only 
if there is affirmative evidence that Congress intended to create such a right of action 
and private remedy. See Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 286-87 (2001), While 
the modern standard is more demanding, it has not entirely eliminated courts’ ability 
to imply rights of action under federal statutes. The desirability of the Court’s shift 
has also created passionate debate amongst legal scholars. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, 
FEDERAL JURISDICTION 400 (5th ed. 2007); see also FALLON, JR., supra note 59, at 
705-08 (documenting the Court’s shift in this area). 
9
Michel: Another Glance at Vance: Examining the Seventh Circuit's About-Fa
Published by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law, 2013




have long held in favor of the ability to provide injunctive relief 
against federal officials who may commit future violations.
61
 In this 
manner the Constitution acts as a shield, protecting the litigant against 
future deprivations of his or her rights before they even occur. But 
what of using the Constitution instead as a sword, arming the litigant 
with a post-deprivation weapon to avenge violations after they occur? 
As the old adage says, sometimes the best defense is a good offense. 
The ability of federal courts to provide litigants with a sword—
money damages—for infringements of constitutional rights was not 
contemplated by the Supreme Court until 1946. In Bell v. Hood, the 
plaintiff sought $3000 in monetary damages against the FBI for 
alleged unconstitutional arrests and searches in violation of the Fourth 
and Fifth Amendments.
62
 Although no particular statute authorized the 
suit, the Court held that federal subject matter jurisdiction existed 
because the case “arose under” the Constitution.
63
 The Court left the 
lower court to determine if the plaintiff had pleaded a valid cause of 
action under federal law.
64
 It would take another twenty-five years, in 
its landmark Bivens decision,
65
 for the Court to return to the issue of 
whether “a federal agent acting under color of his authority gives rise 





                                                 
61
  CHEMERINSKY, supra note 60, at 606 (citing Larson v. Domestic & 
Foreign Commerce Corp., 337 U.S. 682 (1949) (denying injunctive relief against the 
head of the federal War Assets Administration but acknowledging such relief is 
available against a federal officer who acts outside the scope of constitutional 
authority or delegated statutory authority)). 
62
  Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 680-81 (1946). 
63
  Id. at 685. 
64
  Id. On remand, the district court dismissed, finding no cause of action. 
See Bell v. Hood, 71 F.Supp. 813, 821 (S.D. Cal. 1947). 
65
  Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 
U.S. 388 (1971). 
66
  Id. at 389. 
10
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A. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents 
 
In November of 1965, federal agents entered the apartment of 
Webster Bivens and arrested him in front of his wife and children for 
alleged narcotics violations.
67
 The federal agents did so without a 
warrant and allegedly utilized excessive force in making the arrest.
68
 
Bivens sought damages from each of the officers, alleging that the 
arrest violated the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition against 
unreasonable searches and seizures; however, his complaint was 
dismissed by the district court for a failure to state a claim, as no 




In reversing the dismissal of the complaint, the Bivens court 
reiterated its holding from Bell v. Hood that “where federally protected 
rights have been invaded, it has been the rule from the beginning that 
courts will be alert to adjust their remedies so as to grant the necessary 
relief.”
70
 Although no particular statutory provision allowed relief, the 
Court nonetheless proclaimed that awarding damages “should hardly 
seem a surprising proposition,” because “[h]istorically, damages have 




However, the Court did articulate two situations in which 
implying a non-statutory cause of action would be inappropriate, 
although neither applied in the Bivens case. First, where “special 
factors counseling hesitation in the absence of affirmative action by 
Congress” were present, the Court stated it would refuse to create a 
non-statutory remedy.
72
 Additionally, the Court stated where there is 
an “equally effective [remedy] in the view of Congress” to aggrieve a 
wronged plaintiff, implying a non-statutory cause of action would also 
                                                 
67
  Id. 
68
  Id. 
69
  Id. at 389-90.  
70
  Id. at 392 (quoting Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. at 684).  
71
  Bivens, 403 U.S. at 395. 
72
  Id. at 396. 
11
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 The Court, however, did not elaborate what would 
constitute either “special factors” or an “equally effective” alternative 
remedy. 
Bivens has been controversial since its inception because it gives 
the federal courts the power to create federal causes of action, a role 
that is typically thought to be reserved solely to the legislative branch. 
Dissenting in Bivens, Chief Justice Burger stated: 
 
We would more surely preserve the important values of the 
doctrine of separation of powers—and perhaps get a better 
result—by recommending a solution to the Congress as the 
branch of government in which the Constitution has vested 
the legislative power. Legislation is the business of the 
Congress, and it has the facilities and competence for that 




Other dissenters in subsequent Bivens actions have similarly 
argued that the judicial branch undermines the constitutional system 
each time it creates a damages remedy without legislative 
authorization.
75
 Proponents of this view often argue that courts are 
inherently powerless to create such remedies—a formalist view of 
separation of powers—or that courts simply should not foray into the 
legislative domain and make their own policy decisions—a prudential 
concern.
76
 But if a guaranteed constitutional right has been violated 
                                                 
73
  Id. at 397. 
74
  Id. at 411-12 (1971) (Berger, C.J., dissenting). 
75
  See Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 40 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) 
(“it is obvious that when Congress has wished to authorize federal courts to grant 
damages relief, it has known how to do so and has done so expressly”); Corr. Serv. 
Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 75 (2001) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“Bivens is a relic of 
heady days in which this Court assumed common-law powers to create causes of 
action—decreeing them to be ‘implied’ by the mere existence of a statutory or 
constitutional prohibition.”). 
76
  Susan Bandes, Reinventing Bivens: The Self-Executing Constitution, 68 S. 
CAL. L. REV. 289, 312 (1995); see also, e.g., Auchter, supra note 11, at 24-27 
(arguing that Vance II was incorrectly decided because Congress should be the one 
to fashion remedies for violations of constitutional rights in a warzone). 
12
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with no available legislative remedy, an overly formalistic view risks 
missing the “forest” of the document’s promise of individual liberty 




One of [the Constitution’s] important objects is the 
designation of rights. . . . [T]he judiciary is clearly discernible 
as the primary means through which these rights may be 
enforced. . . . Unless such rights are to become merely 
precatory, [litigants with] no effective means other than the 
judiciary to enforce these rights[] must be able to invoke the 





Since Marbury v. Madison, the American constitutional structure 
has required that federal courts allow “every individual to claim the 
protection of the laws, whenever he receives an injury.”
79
 Enforcement 
of constitutional rights cannot be dependent on the affirmative assent 
of the political branches of government, for “the Constitution is meant 
to circumscribe the power of government where it threatens to 
encroach on individuals.”
80
 If that were not the case, the Constitution’s 
system of checks and balances amongst its coexisting three branches 
would be eviscerated. When viewed in this manner, Bivens does not 
offend separation of powers: it reinforces it. 
 
B.  Carlson v. Green 
 
Nine years after Bivens, the Court held in Carlson v. Green that a 
Bivens remedy was appropriate for a violation of the Eighth 
Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment, even 
                                                 
77
  Rebecca L. Brown, Separated Powers and Ordered Liberty, 139 U. PA. L. 
REV. 1513, 1525 (1991). 
78
  Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 241-42 (1979) (allowing a Bivens action 
brought by a former congressional staff member alleging she had been fired on the 
basis of sex in violation of the Fifth Amendment). 
79
  Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 163 (1803). 
80
  Bandes, supra note 76, at 292. 
13
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though the Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”) created a parallel 
remedy.
81
 In Carlson, a mother had sued federal prison officials on 
behalf of her deceased son, alleging he had died from personal injuries 
while in the prison.
82
 In allowing her to proceed with her Bivens 
action, the majority opinion unequivocally stated that, “victims of a 
constitutional violation by a federal agent have a right to recover 
damages against the official in federal court despite the absence of any 
statute conferring such a right.”
83
  
Carlson was an important Bivens decision in two respects. First, 
the decision expanded Bivens liability to allegations of prisoner abuse. 
Second, the Carlson Court articulated several reasons why Bivens was 
an effective avenue for remedying certain constitutional violations. 
Although the FTCA provided an alternative remedy against the United 
States generally, the Court found the FTCA to be a “counterpart” to 
individual Bivens liability, and not preemptive.
84
 The greater deterrent 
effect of personal liability, the possibility of punitive damages, and the 
option for a jury trial, were all found to be justifications for extending 




C. Chappell v. Wallace 
 
The Supreme Court first considered Bivens liability in the military 
context in Chappell v. Wallace, in which five black Navy servicemen 
sued several of their superior officers, alleging intentional acts of 
unconstitutional racial discrimination.
86
 The Ninth Circuit had 
authorized the award of damages based on Bivens, but the Court 
reversed in a unanimous decision.
87
 In doing so, the Court cited Feres 
                                                 
81
  Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 18-22 (1980). 
82
  Id. at 16.  
83
  Id. at 18. 
84
  Id. at 20. 
85
  Id. at 21-22. 
86
  Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296, 297 (1983). 
87
  Id. at 298. 
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 which had previously addressed the question of 
“whether soldiers could maintain tort suits [under the FTCA] against 
the government for injuries arising out of their military service.”
89
 
While the FTCA’s language was broad enough to permit such 
recovery, Feres held that “the peculiar and special relationship of the 
soldier to his superiors” precluded such an award.
90
 Put another way, 
the Feres Court held that civilian courts should not award FTCA 
damages to members of the military without explicit congressional 
authorization to do so. 
Although the Chappell Court acknowledged that the question of 
Bivens liability was distinct from the question of FTCA liability in 
Feres, the Court still relied heavily on Feres’ analysis to determine 
whether a “special factor” that precluded a Bivens remedy was 
present.
91
 The Court ultimately held that, based on the “unique 
disciplinary structure of the military establishment,” as well as 
Congress’ establishment of an internal military system for review of 
complaints and grievances, it would be “inappropriate to provide 





D. United States v. Stanley 
 
Chappell created confusion in the lower courts as to whether all 
Bivens suits arising out of military service were barred or just suits 
involving an officer-subordinate relationship.
93
 In United States v. 
Stanley, the Court addressed this confusion, expressly precluding all 
Bivens suits “aris[ing] out of or in the course of activity incident to 
                                                 
88
  Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135 (1950). 
89
  Chappell, 462 U.S. at 299. 
90
  Id. (internal citations omitted). 
91
  Id.; see also id. at 304 (“Here, as in Feres, we must be concerned with the 
disruption of the peculiar and special relationship of the soldier to his superiors’ that 
might result if the soldier were allowed to hale his superiors into court.”) (internal 
punctuation and citations omitted). 
92
  Id. at 304. 
93
  CHEMERINSKY, supra note 60, at 621. 
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 In Stanley, a former Army sergeant plaintiff had 
been secretly administered doses of LSD without his knowledge or 
consent.
95
 He filed suit under the FTCA, but his complaint was 
dismissed as barred by the aforementioned Feres doctrine.
96
 However, 
the lower court ruled the plaintiff could still seek damages under 
Bivens.
97
 The Court reversed, reiterating that “uninvited intrusion by 
the judiciary” into military affairs is inappropriate.
98
 The Court 
clarified that the “special factor counseling hesitation” articulated in 
Chappell was not limited to the military officer-subordinate context. 
Rather, the “special factor” was as extensive as the one articulated in 
Feres, where the Court held that the FTCA does not apply to “injuries 
to servicemen where the injuries arise out of or are in the course of 
activity incident to service.”
99
 Thus, because the Stanley plaintiff’s 
injury was one that had occurred in the course of activity incident to 




E.  Current Status of Bivens 
 
The Court in the last several decades has “consistently refused to 
expand, and indeed has substantially limited, the availability of Bivens 
suits.”
101
 For example, in Correctional Services Corp. v. Malesko,
102
 a 
Bivens case denying recovery against a private corporation operating 
in conjunction with the federal Bureau of Prisons, then Chief Justice 
Rehnquist stated: 
 
                                                 
94
  United States v. Stanley, 483 U.S. 669, 683 (1987). 
95
  Id. at 671. 
96
  Id. at 672. 
97
  Id. 
98
  Id. at 683. 
99
  Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 146 (1950) (emphasis added). 
100
  Stanley, 483 U.S. at 683-84. 
101
  CHEMERINSKY, supra note 60, at 613. 
102
  Corr. Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61 (2001). 
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Since [Carlson v. Green] we have consistently refused to 
extend Bivens liability to any new context or new category of 
defendants. . . . In 30 years of Bivens jurisprudence we have 
extended its holding only twice, to provide an otherwise 
nonexistent cause of action against individual officers alleged 
to have acted unconstitutionally, or to provide a cause of 
action for a plaintiff who lacked any alternative remedy for 
harms caused by an individual officer’s unconstitutional 
conduct. Where such circumstances are not present, we have 




In its 2007 decision of Wilkie v. Robbins, the Court cautioned that 
Bivens is not an “automatic entitlement” to non-statutory damages; 
rather, the application of Bivens must “represent a judgment about the 
best way to implement a constitutional guarantee.”
104
 Most recently, in 
Minneci v. Pollard, the Court held that a Bivens action brought against 
the employees of a privately operated federal prison was 
impermissible because state tort law provided an adequate alternative 
remedy.
105
 In a concurring opinion, Justices Scalia and Thomas 
characterized Bivens as “a relic of heady days in which this Court 
assumed common-law powers to create causes of action by 
constitutional implication.”
106
 But despite this increased hesitancy to 
apply the doctrine in new settings, Bivens has never been overruled. 
 
III. THE LITIGATION 
 
Upon their return to the United States, Vance and Ertel sued 
former Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld in his individual 
capacity, as well as a number of unidentified defendants at Camp 
                                                 
103
  Id. at 68-70. 
104
  Wilkie v. Robbins, 551 U.S. 537, 550 (2007) (denying a Bivens remedy to 
a rancher who alleged he was intimidated and harassed by the government into 
granting an easement). 
105
  Minneci v. Pollard, 132 S.Ct. 617, 623 (2012). 
106
  Id. at 626 (Scalia, J., concurring) (quoting Corr. Serv. Corp., 534 U.S. at 
75) (internal punctuation omitted). 
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Cropper whose identities were then unknown.
107
 Rumsfeld responded 
with a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. 
 
A.  Vance I – The District Court 
 
In determining whether to grant former Secretary Rumsfeld’s 
motion to dismiss, Judge Wayne Anderson of the Northern District of 
Illinois first confronted the question of whether Rumsfeld was entitled 
to qualified immunity, which would extinguish the right to seek a 
remedy under Bivens.
108
 This analysis required a two-step inquiry: (1) 
“whether the facts alleged show that the official’s conduct violated a 
constitutional right,” and if so, (2) whether that right was “clearly 
established” at the time of the alleged conduct.
109
 After lengthy 
examination, Judge Anderson answered both in the affirmative and 
denied Rumsfeld’s qualified immunity defense.
110
 Judge Anderson 
found the plaintiffs had sufficiently alleged conduct that cumulatively 
was enough to “shock the conscience of those belonging to a civilized 
system of justice[.]”
111
Judge Anderson also found that relevant 
precedent had established that “American citizens do not forfeit their 
core constitutional rights when they leave the United States, even 
when their destination is a foreign war zone,”
112
 and concluded it was 
“recogni[zed] that federal officials may not strip citizens of well-
settled constitutional protections against mistreatment simply because 
they are located in a tumultuous foreign setting.”
113
 
After determining the defendants did not possess qualified 
immunity, Judge Anderson next conducted a Bivens analysis to 
                                                 
107
  Vance II, 653 F.3d 591, 598, fn. 4 (7th Cir. 2011). 
108
  Vance I, 694 F.Supp.2d 957, 965 (N.D. Ill. 2010). 
109
  Id. at 966 (citing Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 200-01 (2001)). 
110
  Vance I, 694 F.Supp.2d at 966-71. 
111
  Id. at 966 (quoting Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 174 (1952)) 
(internal punctuation omitted). 
112
  Vance I, 694 F.Supp.2d  at 970. 
113
  Id. at 971. 
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determine whether that remedy was available.
114
 In his analysis, Judge 
Anderson gave little attention to whether adequate alternative 
remedies existed, as both sides had apparently agreed that the only 
arguably applicable federal statute under the alleged facts (the 
Detainee Treatment Act) provided no remedy.
115
 Judge Anderson 
found the absence of an alternative remedy “strong support” for the 
application of Bivens, for “litigants who allege that their own 
constitutional rights have been violated, who at the same time have no 
effective means other than the judiciary to enforce these rights, must 
be able to invoke the existing jurisdiction of the courts for the 
protection of their justiciable constitutional rights.”
116
 
As to whether any “special factors counseled hesitation,” Judge 
Anderson analyzed three arguments offered by Rumsfeld: “separation 
of powers, misuse of the courts as a weapon to interfere with the war 
effort, and other serious adverse consequences for national 
defense.”
117
 Judge Anderson proclaimed that “a state of war is not a 
blank check . . . when it comes to the rights of the American citizens, 
and therefore, it does not infringe on the core role of the military for 
the courts to exercise their-honored and constitutionally mandated 
roles of reviewing and resolving claims like those presented here.”
118
 
Rather, “[w]hen an American citizen sets out well-pled allegations of 
torturous behavior by executive officials abroad,” courts have a duty 
to examine the individual circumstances rather than issue blanket 
protection, which would risk “condens[ing] power into a single branch 
of government.”
119
 Therefore, finding there were no “special factors 
counseling hesitation” precluding a Bivens remedy, Judge Anderson 
denied Rumsfeld’s motion to dismiss.
120
 
                                                 
114
  Id. 
115
  Id. at 972. 
116
  Id. (quoting Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 242 (1979)). 
117
  Id. at 973. 
118
  Id. at 974 (citing Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 535 (2004)) (internal 
quotations omitted). 
119
  Id. at 975 (quoting Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 535-36). 
120
  Id. 
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Also of note in Judge Anderson’s opinion was the rejection of 
Rumsfeld’s argument that the Supreme Court’s consistent refusal to 
extend Bivens in “any new context or category of defendants” was 
itself a reason to dismiss.
121
 While Judge Anderson acknowledged 
there had been an increased hesitancy to apply Bivens, he believed “it 
can hardly be said [that the Court has] adopted a steadfast rule against” 





B.  Vance II – The Seventh Circuit Panel 
 
On appeal, a three-member panel of the Seventh Circuit affirmed 
Judge Anderson’s decision, finding that “a Bivens remedy should be 
available to civilian U.S. citizens in a war zone, at least for claims of 
torture or worse,” and that Vance and Ertel had adequately pled such a 
claim against Rumsfeld, who was not entitled to qualified immunity.
123
 
Notably, regarding Rumsfeld’s personal responsibility, the majority 
panel found not only that the “plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged that 
Secretary Rumsfeld acted deliberately in authorizing interrogation 
techniques that amount to torture,” but also went further than Judge 
Anderson and found that Vance and Ertel sufficiently pled facts 
showing “deliberate indifference” by Rumsfeld in failing to stop the 
torture despite actual knowledge of the unconstitutional abuse.
124
 
Qualified immunity was denied because, for much the same reasons 
articulated by Judge Anderson, “a reasonable official in Secretary 
Rumsfeld’s position in 2006 would have realized that the right of a 
United States citizen to be free from torture at the hands of one’s own 
                                                 
121
  Id. at 972. 
122
  Id. 
123
  Vance II, 653 F.3d 591, 598-99 (7th Cir. 2012). 
124
  Id. at 600; see also id. at 601-04 (detailing the Complaint’s allegations 
that Secretary Rumsfeld “devised,” “authorized,” “directed,” and “supervised” 
policies that permitted the use of unlawful torture in Iraq and ignored “specific 
direction from Congress” and “took no action” to stop such policies). 
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government was a ‘clearly established’ constitutional right and that the 
techniques alleged by plaintiffs add up to torture.”
125
 
As to the appropriateness of a Bivens remedy, the majority began 
by asserting that there would be “no doubt that if a federal official, 
even a military officer, tortured a prisoner in the United States, the 
tortured prisoner could sue for damages under Bivens.”
126
 As to 
whether any special factors counseled hesitation,
127
 the majority first 
noted that Rumsfeld’s asserted immunity would effectively immunize 
all military personnel in a war zone from civil liability for acts of 
“deliberate torture and even cold-blooded murder of civilian U.S. 
citizens,” an immunity the court characterized as “truly 
unprecedented.”
128
 In questioning the appropriateness of this 
expansive immunity, the majority explicitly rejected the applicability 
of Chappell and Stanley,
129
 finding it was “well established under 
Bivens that civilians may sue military personnel who violate their 
constitutional rights.”
130
 As to the constitutional implications of the 
alleged violations occurring in a war zone on foreign soil, the majority 
stated that even outside our nation’s borders the United States’ powers 
are still subject to constitutional restrictions,
131
 and “when civilian 
U.S. citizens leave the United States, they take with them their 
constitutional rights that protect them from their own government.”
132
 
                                                 
125
  Id. at 611. 
126
  Id. 
127
  The majority did briefly address whether an alternative remedy existed for 
the plaintiffs—which Rumsfeld had conceded at the trial level was not the case—
because it received an amicus brief from former Department of Defense officials 
offering alternatives for relief such as internal military detainee complaint 
procedures, the Geneva Conventions, or the Uniform Code of Military Justice. Id. at 
613. The majority found none of the proposed alternative remedies sufficiently 
meaningful in the Bivens context. Id. 
128
  Id. at 615. 
129
  Id. at 616, fn. 17. 
130
  Id. at 616. 
131
  Id. at 617 (quoting Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 765 (2008)). 
132
  Id. at 616 (citing Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957)). 
21
Michel: Another Glance at Vance: Examining the Seventh Circuit's About-Fa
Published by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law, 2013




With these considerations in mind, the majority rejected the two 
special factors proffered by Rumsfeld. First, Rumsfeld argued that 
courts should not interfere with military decision-making out of 
respect for the Executive’s constitutional role in such matters.
133
 
However, the majority believed the plaintiffs were simply seeking 
redress for individual wrongs, not seeking an inappropriately broad 
challenge to military policy through the courts.
134
 Additionally, the 
majority believed its role in reviewing statutory and constitutional 
claims of torture by the executive reinforced the separation of powers 
doctrine rather than undermined it, protecting against unchecked abuse 
of authority by one branch of government..
135
 Secondly, Rumsfeld 
argued that because Congress had passed legislation regarding 
detainee treatment without providing a statutory private right of action, 
it did not intend for such a right to exist and thus Bivens remedies were 
inappropriate.
136
 The majority rejected this argument on the basis that 
Bivens is a well-known legal doctrine that Congress assuredly was 
aware might apply when enacting such legislation, and thus taking no 
steps to foreclose Bivens remedies actually supported their 
application.
137
 The majority concluded its Bivens discussion as 
follows: 
 
If we were to accept the defendant’s invitation to recognize 
the broad and unprecedented immunity they seek, then the 
judicial branch—which is charged with enforcing 
constitutional rights—would be leaving our citizens 
defenseless to serious abuse or worse by another branch of 
their own government. . . . Relying solely on the military to 
police its own treatment of civilians . . . would amount to an 
                                                 
133
  Id. at 618. 
134
  Id. 
135
  Id. at 619. 
136
  Id. at 622. 
137
  Id. 
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extraordinary abdication of our government’s checks and 




C. Vance III – The En Banc Reversal 
 
Rumsfeld was then granted a rehearing en banc, which vacated 
the panel opinion.
139
 At the outset, the en banc majority noted that the 
Supreme Court “has not created another [Bivens action] during the last 
32 years—though it has reversed more than a dozen appellate 
decisions that had created new actions for damages.”
140
 Operating 
under the assumption that Bivens was generally disfavored, the 
majority stated the Supreme Court had “never created or even 
favorably mentioned the possibility of non-statutory right of action for 
damages against military personnel . . . [and had] never created or 
even favorably mentioned a nonstatutory right of action for damages 




Unlike the panel opinion, the en banc majority found the Chappell 
and Stanley decisions relevant in that their “principal point was the 
civilian courts should not interfere with the military chain of 
command . . . without statutory authority.”
142
 The majority expressed 
the belief that the judiciary’s inexperience in the area of military 
discipline meant that the executive branch and Congress were best 
suited to weigh the “essential tradeoffs” and make the difficult 
decisions regarding the appropriateness of damages awards against 
soldiers and their superiors.
143
 The majority then noted that Congress 
had recently enacted or amended several statutes affecting the interests 
and rights of military detainees, none of which provided for personal 
                                                 
138
  Id. at 625-26. 
139
  Vance III, 701 F.3d 193, 197 (7th Cir. 2012). 
140
  Id. at 198. 
141
  Id. at 198-99. 
142
  Id. at 199. 
143
  Id. at 200. 
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damages remedies against military personnel or their superiors.
144
 
While the relief provided by these statutes is both capped and 
discretionary—and thus not a full substitute for a Bivens remedy—the 
majority believed it signaled Congressional intent to provide 
compensatory relief for claims against military personnel from the 
public treasury rather than private pockets.
145
 
After quickly dispensing with the civilian status of the plaintiffs 
as irrelevant,
146
 the majority then proceeded to find Vance and Ertel’s 
status as American citizens immaterial as well, stating that the Court 
“has never suggested that citizenship matters to a claim under 
Bivens.”
147
 After holding that “the choice of remedies for military 
misconduct belongs to Congress and the President rather than the 
judicial branch”
148
—thus granting the blanket immunity expressly 
repudiated by the vacated panel opinion as “truly unprecedented”
149
—
the court proceeded to unnecessarily determine Rumsfeld could not 
have been held liable anyway, as the Supreme Court decision of 
Ashcroft v. Iqbal made clear that Cabinet officials are not vicariously 
liable for the actions of their subordinates if they only possess “mere 
knowledge” of such actions.
150
 
                                                 
144
  Id. at 200-01. 
145
  Id. at 201. 
146
  Id. at 199 (“Plaintiffs say that [Chappell and Stanley] are irrelevant 
because [Vance and Ertel] were not soldiers. That is not so clear. They were security 
contractors in a war zone, performing much of the same role as soldiers. . . . But we 
need not decide whether civilians doing security work in combat zones are soldiers 
by another name, because Chappell and Stanley did not entirely depend on the 
relation between the soldier and the superior officer.”) 
147
  Id. at 203. 
148
  Id. 
149
  Vance II, 653 F.3d 591, 615 (7th Circuit 2012). 
150
  Vance III, 701 F.3d at 203 (citing Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677 
(2009)). Rather, the majority asserted, Vance and Ertel would have been required to 
plead that “Rumsfeld knew of a substantial risk to security contractors’ employees, 
and ignored that risk because he wanted plaintiffs (or similarly situated persons) to 
be harmed,” an allegation the majority acknowledged as implausible. Vance III, 701 
F.3d at 204. 
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Judge Wood concurred in the judgment (believing that Rumsfeld 
was entitled to qualified immunity), but disagreed with the majority’s 
blanket immunity for the military personnel “who actually committed 
these heinous acts.”
151
 Judges Hamilton, Rovner, and Williams each 
dissented, parts of which will be addressed in conjunction with Part IV 
below. A petition for writ of certiorari was filed with the Supreme 






The en banc decision was incorrect in three major respects. First, 
the majority improperly interpreted two major Supreme Court 
decisions involving Bivens in the military context to exempt all 
military personnel from Bivens liability to civilian plaintiffs, an 
“extraordinary result” that “the Court would not have casually 
embraced” without being more explicit.
153
 Second, the majority failed 
to appreciate how the existing doctrine of qualified immunity already 
alleviates one of the primary concerns used to justify granting absolute 
immunity. Third, the majority neglected its necessary role as guardians 
of constitutional liberties—particularly in times of war—by deferring 
scrutiny of the necessity of such dreadful acts to other branches of 
government. 
 
A. Failure to Differentiate from Chappell and Stanley 
 
The en banc majority opinion plays a game of misdirection with 
the Chappell and Stanley precedents. It does so by first stretching 
Chappell and Stanley as broadly as possible to help cast doubt on the 
plaintiffs’ claim, which then allows the majority to more easily dismiss 
the critical factual differences of Chappell and Stanley as irrelevant. 
The majority first introduces Chappell and Stanley as sweeping 
Supreme Court proclamations holding that it is inappropriate to create 
                                                 
151
  Vance III, 701 F.3d at 206 (Wood, J., concurring). 
152
  Vance v. Rumsfeld, No. 12-976, 2013 WL 488898 (U.S. June 10, 2013). 
153
  Vance III, 701 F.3d at 211 (Hamilton, J., dissenting). 
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non-statutory claims for damages against military personnel, using this 
characterization to create a presumption against the plaintiffs’ claims: 
 
The Supreme Court has never created or even favorably 
mentioned the possibility of a non-statutory right of action for 
damages against military personnel, and it has twice held that 
it would be inappropriate to create such a claim for damages. 
[Chappell, Wallace.] . . . Yet plaintiffs propose a novel 
damages remedy against military personnel who acted in a 




However, the majority is then confronted with the actual, 
narrower holdings of Chappell and Stanley—that members of the 
military cannot recover from other members of the military under 
Bivens for incidents arising out of military service—and dismisses this 
critical factual difference in the case before it as irrelevant: 
 
Chappell and Stanley hold that it is inappropriate for the 
judiciary to create a right of action that would permit a 
soldier to collect damages from a superior officer. 
Plaintiffs say that these decisions are irrelevant because they 
were not soldiers. That is not so clear. They were security 
contractors in a war zone, performing much the same role as 
soldiers. . . . But we need not decide whether civilians doing 
security work in combat zones are soldiers by another name, 
because Chappell and Stanley did not entirely depend on the 




The majority’s obfuscation of Chappell and Stanley is necessary 
because a correct reading of those two precedents clearly demonstrates 
they are not controlling. Aside from the obvious factual difference 
that, unlike Vance and Ertel, the Chappell and Stanley plaintiffs were 
military servicemen, the decisions in Chappell, Stanley, and Feres 
                                                 
154
  Id. at 198-99. 
155
  Id. at 199 (emphasis added). 
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(upon which the Chappell and Stanley decisions heavily relied)
156
 are 
clearly concerned with civilian courts interfering with intra-military 
discipline. They are not blanket proclamations that “civilian courts 
should not interfere with the military chain of command,”
157
 regardless 
of the military or civilian status of the plaintiff. 
In Feres, the Supreme Court held that the FTCA does not apply to 
“injuries to servicemen where the injuries arise out of or are in the 
course of activity incident to service.”
158
 The Court came to this 
conclusion by focusing on Congress’ enactment of compensation 
schemes for service members who are injured or killed, and the 
peculiar difficulties faced by soldiers who bring litigation outside of 
intra-military channels.
159
 The Court did not say or make any 
inference that civilian courts inappropriately interfering with military 
matters was a primary concern. 
In Chappell, in which the Supreme Court specifically stated that 
Feres guided its analysis,
160
 the Court declared that, “no military 
organization can function without strict discipline and regulation that 
would be unacceptable in a civilian setting.”
161
 It further elaborated 
that “[t]he inescapable demands of military discipline and obedience 
to orders cannot be taught on battlefields . . . but combat inevitably 




[C]enturies of experience has developed a hierarchical 
structure of discipline and obedience to command, unique in 
its application to the military establishment and wholly 
different from civilian patterns. Civilian courts must, at the 
                                                 
156
  See Chappell, 462 U.S. at 299 (“[T]he Court’s analysis in Feres guides 
our analysis in this case.”); Stanley, 483 U.S. at 683-84 (reaffirming Chappell as 
“require[ing] abstention in the inferring of Bivens actions as extensive as the 
exception to the FTCA established by Feres[.]”). 
157
  Vance III, 701 F.3d at 199. 
158
  Feres, 340 U.S. at 146 (emphasis added). 
159
  Id. at 144-45. 
160
  Chappell, 462 U.S. at 299. 
161
  Id. at 300. 
162
  Id. 
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very least, hesitate long before entertaining a suit which asks 
the court to tamper with the established relationship 
between enlisted military personnel and their superior 
officers; that relationship is at the heart of the necessarily 




A plain reading of Chappell shows that the Court was concerned 
with civilian courts improperly interfering with the command and 
disciplinary structure between enlisted military personnel and their 
superior officers. Yet the Vance majority fleetingly interprets this same 
passage in Chappell as a general observation that “military efficiency 
depends on a particular command structure, which civilian judges 
could mess up without appreciating what they were doing.”
164
 It 
avoids any mention that the Court was referring to interfering with the 
intra-military command structure. 
The Vance majority also mischaracterizes the holding of Stanley 
in order fit Vance within its purview. In Stanley, the Supreme Court 
“reaffirm[ed] the reasoning of Chappell” and stated that Chappell’s 
holding—no Bivens recovery for injuries arising out of military 
service—“extend[s] beyond the situation in which an officer-
subordinate relationship exists[.]”
165
 The Seventh Circuit viewed this 
statement as reason to extend Chappell’s bar on Bivens recovery to 
non-military civilians.
166
 However, when the Stanley Court made that 
statement, it was responding to the Stanley plaintiff’s argument that 
“the defendants in this case were not Stanley’s superior military 
officers . . . and that the chain-of-command concerns at the heart of 
Chappell . . . are not implicated.”
167
 Put another way, the plaintiff in 
Stanley unsuccessfully argued that Chappell was inapplicable because 
                                                 
163
  Id. (emphasis added). 
164
  Vance III, 701 F.3d at 200. 
165
  Stanley, 483 U.S. at 683. 
166
  Vance III, 701 F.3d at 199 (“[W]e need not decide whether civilians doing 
security work in combat zones are soldiers by another name, because Chappell and 
Stanley did not entirely depend on the relation between the soldier and the superior 
officer.”) 
167
  Stanley, 483 U.S. at 679. 
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the defendants were not his superior officers. The Supreme Court 
rejected this argument because Feres, upon which Chappell relied, 
“did not consider the officer-subordinate relationship crucial,”
168
 but 
rather was concerned with “injuries to servicemen where the injuries 
arise out of or are in the course of activity incident to service.”
169
 
When the Stanley court said Chappell’s holding “extends beyond the 
officer/subordinate context,” it clearly meant that a military plaintiff 
was still prohibited from suing persons other than a superior officer for 
injuries arising from military service. Stanley is entirely silent with 
regards to civilian plaintiffs. 
Thus, while the Seventh Circuit read Chappell and Stanley as 
broadly precluding civilians from obtaining a Bivens remedy against 
the military, neither case involved such a claim, neither case articulates 
such a holding, and both cases’ reasoning relied on intra-military 
concerns. Furthermore, as Judge Hamilton
170
 and Judge Williams
171
 
each pointed out in dissent, if the Vance majority were correct in its 
broad interpretation of Chappell and Stanley, the Supreme Court 
would have demonstrated such in Saucier v. Katz.
172
 In that case, the 
plaintiff was a non-military U.S. citizen who brought a Bivens claim 
for excessive force against a military police officer.
173
 The Court went 
through a lengthy analysis of whether the military officer was entitled 
to qualified immunity, but made no mention nor gave any inference 
that a civilian was precluded from bringing a Bivens action against the 
military under Chappell or Stanley. In fact, Saucier fails to even 
mention Chappell or Stanley. Although the qualified immunity 
analysis utilized in Saucier was eventually scrapped,
174
 Saucier is still 
                                                 
168
  Id. at 680. 
169
  Feres, 340 U.S. at 146 (emphasis added). 
170
  Vance III, 701 F.3d at 212-13. 
171
  Id. at 228, n. 2. 
172
  Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194 (2001). 
173
  Id. at 198-99. 
174
  See Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236 (2009) (holding that courts 
may start with either prong of the two-step analysis used to determine qualified 
immunity, abandoning the mandatory sequential procedure adopted in Saucier); see 
also Section IV.B, infra, discussing qualified immunity. 
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an important decision that the Vance majority only mentions in a 
procedural context.
175
 Judge Hamilton’s dissent also brings attention to 
a Seventh Circuit decision from 2003 in which a civilian brought a 
Bivens claim against military officers for violating his Fourth and Fifth 
Amendment rights.
176
 The Seventh Circuit barred the plaintiff’s claim, 
but made no reference to Chappell or Stanley or military personnel’s 
general immunity from Bivens liability.
177
 
In sum, the Seventh Circuit had the opportunity to distinguish the 
facts before it in Vance from the Supreme Court’s Chappell and 
Stanley precedents—which “[s]cholars are virtually unanimous in 
strongly criticizing”
178
—but instead stretched Chappell and Stanley to 
preclude relief for a class of plaintiffs not considered in either 
decision. 
 
B.  Failure to Appreciate the Existing Significance of Qualified 
Immunity 
 
The en banc majority expressed concern that the potential for 
Bivens liability could “divert[] Cabinet officers’ time from 
management of public affairs to the defense of their bank accounts.”
179
 
However, the existing doctrine of qualified immunity—thoroughly 
analyzed by both the district court and appeals panel
180
—already 
provides a proper balance to assuage the majority’s worry that the 
nation’s leaders will act to defend their bank accounts to the detriment 
                                                 
175
  See Vance III, 701 F.3d at 197 (citing to Saucier when determining the 
court is “authorized to address the merits” of Rumsfeld’s immunity defense). 
176
  Id. at 213 (Hamilton, J. dissenting) (citing Case v. Milewski, 327 F.3d 
564 (7th Cir. 2003)). 
177
  Case, 327 F.3d at 568-69. 
178
  CHEMERINSKY, supra note 60, at 622, fn. 88. 
179
  Vance III, 701 F.3d at 202. 
180
  Vance I, 694 F.Supp.2d 957, 965-971 (N.D. Ill. 2010); Vance II, 653 F.3d 
591, 605-11 (7th Cir. 2011). 
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of the nation’s security.
181
 Even when a cause of action is recognized 
under Bivens, defendants may still raise qualified immunity as an 
affirmative defense. Qualified immunity “balances two important 
interests—the need to hold public officials accountable when they 
exercise power irresponsibly and the need to shield officials from 
harassment, distraction, and liability when they perform their duties 
reasonably.”
182
 Qualified immunity is a sizeable hurdle for Bivens 
plaintiffs to clear.
183
 The existence of qualified immunity in a Bivens 
suit makes the Seventh Circuit’s granting of absolute immunity from 
Bivens for the military even more puzzling, as federal officials who act 
in good faith executing their duties under the Constitution are already 
not subject to liability under Bivens. 
If anything, modern qualified immunity jurisprudence already tilts 
in favor of protecting public officers from meritless litigation at the 
expense of ensuring actually injured plaintiffs receive 
compensation.
184
 The qualified immunity doctrine protects 
government officials “from liability for civil damages insofar as their 
conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional 
rights of which a reasonable person would have known.”
185
 That is, 
even if a government official violates someone’s constitutional rights, 
the official is liable for damages only if it would have been “clear to a 
reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful in the situation he 
                                                 
181
  Judge Wood found this concern to be “disrespectful of both the dedication 
of those who serve in government and the serious interests that the plaintiffs are 
raising.” Vance III, 701 F.3d at 193, 210 (Wood, J., concurring). 
182
  Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009) (holding that police 
officers who conducted a warrantless search of the plaintiff’s home were entitled to 
qualified immunity from Section 1983 liability). Qualified immunity of federal 
officers is identical to the qualified immunity afforded to state and local officials 
under Section 1983. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 809 (1982). 
183
  CHEMERINSKY, supra note 60, at 606-07. 
184
  Id. at 548. 
185
  Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818. 
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 While there need not be a prior court decision 
precisely on point in order to place a government official “on notice” 
that his or her conduct violates clearly established law,
187
 if the 
government official still has some objectively reasonable justification 
that the specific act they undertook was not unconstitutional, he or she 
is entitled to qualified immunity.
188
 
This highly deferential qualified immunity doctrine already 
provides government officials who execute their duties in good faith 
with more than enough protection from Bivens liability when it comes 
to matters of national security. For example, in Mitchell v. Forsyth, 
Attorney General John Mitchell had authorized a warrantless wiretap 
of a member of an antiwar group he believed to be planning to 
detonate bombs in Washington, D.C. and possibly to kidnap National 
Security Advisor Henry Kissinger.
189
 After the wiretap had been 
placed, the Supreme Court issued a decision prohibiting the use of 
such warrantless wiretaps, even in cases involving domestic threats to 
national security.
190
 The Forsyth Court nonetheless extended qualified 
immunity to Attorney General Mitchell for authorizing the warrantless 
wiretap because the legality of such conduct was “an open question” at 
                                                 
186
  Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 202 (2001) (holding that military police 
officer who arrested demonstrator protesting at a public event featuring Vice 
President Gore was entitled to qualified immunity from Bivens liability). 
187
  Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 741 (2002) (holding that prison guards who 
handcuffed an inmate to a hitching post for several hours without water or access to 
a bathroom were not entitled to qualified immunity from Section 1983 liability 
despite there being no cases with “materially similar” facts to put them “on notice” 
that their conduct was unconstitutional); but see Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194, 
201 (2004) (holding that a lack of “on point” cases may aid in demonstrating that a 
government official’s conduct was not a “clearly established” constitutional 
violation). 
188
  Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 639-41 (1987) (holding that an FBI 
agent who conducted a warrantless search of the plaintiff’s home was entitled to 
qualified immunity if a reasonable officer could have believed such a warrantless 
search to be lawful based on the information the FBI agent possessed at the time). 
189
  Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 513 (1985). 
190
  U.S. v. U.S. Dist. Court for E. Dist. of Mich., 407 U.S. 297 (1972). 
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the time it occurred, and the Court refused to determine qualified 
immunity on the basis of “hindsight-based reasoning.”
191
 
For a more recent example of the power of qualified immunity in 
the context of the War on Terror, one need only look at the Ninth 
Circuit’s decision in Padilla v. Yoo.
192
 In that case, an American citizen 
detained as an enemy combatant after the 9/11 attacks alleged he was 
unconstitutionally tortured while in military detention.
193
 He sought 
civil damages from John Yoo, the Deputy Assistant Attorney General 
in the Department of Justice’s Office of Legal Counsel who allegedly 
drafted a series of memoranda that justified his unlawful treatment.
194
 
The Supreme Court’s decision in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld
195
 called into 
question the constitutionality of all these practices, but the decision 
was not issued until after all of Yoo’s memoranda.
196
 While there were 
certainly “clearly established” constitutional rights for prisoners 
subject to ordinary criminal process at the time of Yoo’s memoranda, 
the Ninth Circuit held that because of Padilla’s unusual status of 
“enemy combatant” as designated by the President, a government 
                                                 
191
  Forsyth, 472 U.S. at 535.  
192
  Padilla v. Yoo, 678 F.3d 748 (9th Cir. 2012). 
193
  Id. at 751. In a familiar set of allegations, Padilla claimed he suffered 
“gross physical and psychological abuse . . . including extreme isolation; 
interrogation under threat of torture, deportation and even death; prolonged sleep 
adjustment and sensory deprivation; exposure to extreme temperatures and noxious 
odors, denial of access to necessary medical and psychiatric care; substantial 
interference with his ability to practice his religion, and incommunicado detention 
for almost two years, without access to family, counsel or the courts. Id. at 752. 
194
  Id. For example, Yoo authored memoranda that stated “the Fourth 
Amendment had no application to domestic military operations”; that “restrictions 
outlined in the Fifth Amendment simply do not address actions the Executive takes 
in conducting a military campaign against the nation’s enemies”; that interrogation 
techniques are only considered torture if they cause damage rising “to the level of 
death, organ failure, or the permanent impairment of a significant body function”; 
that approved aggressive interrogation techniques not permitted by the military field 
manual; and approved the use of mind-altering drugs during interrogations. Id. at 
753. 
195
  Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004). 
196
  Padilla, 678 F.3d at 760-61. 
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official “could have had some reason to believe that Padilla’s harsh 
treatment fell within constitutional bounds.”
197
 Additionally, even 
though the Ninth Circuit found that “the unconstitutionality of 
torturing a United States citizen was ‘beyond debate’ by 2001,”
198
 Yoo 
was still entitled to qualified immunity because there was 
“considerable debate” at the time as to whether the specific 
interrogation techniques promoted by Yoo amounted to “torture.”
199
 
Thus, Yoo was entitled to qualified immunity on all claims.
200
 
If not already apparent, qualified immunity is a difficult obstacle 
to surpass when seeking civil liability against a government official. 
But that is by design; courts must balance the interest of insulating 
public figures from frivolous lawsuits against the equally weighty 
public interest in deterring unlawful conduct. Both the district court 
and appeals panel in Vance carefully evaluated this balance and 
determined that Rumsfeld was not entitled to such immunity.
201
 Yet the 
en banc majority makes this inquiry—much less its conclusion—
irrelevant by providing absolute immunity for all military personnel, 





C. Failure to Appreciate the Historic Role of the Judiciary as a 
Wartime Constitutional Guardian 
 
As an additional factor in its opinion, the en banc majority quoted 
the Supreme Court’s 1981 decision in Haig v. Agee, in which the Court 
stated that “[m]atters intimately related to . . . national security are 
rarely proper subjects for judicial intervention.”
203
 Notwithstanding 
                                                 
197
  Id. at 762. 
198
  Id. at 763-64. 
199
  Id. at 767-68. 
200
  Id. at 768. 
201
  Vance I, 694 F.Supp.2d 957, 965-971 (N.D. Ill. 2010); Vance II, 653 F.3d 
591, 605-11 (7th Cir. 2011). 
202
  Vance III, 701 F.3d 193, 206 (7th Cir. 2012) (Wood, J., concurring). 
203
  Id. at 200 (quoting Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 292 (1981)). 
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the glaring factual differences between the two cases—Phillip Agee 
was a former undercover CIA agent who was challenging the 
Secretary of State’s administrative decision to revoke his passport
204
—
the Seventh Circuit’s acquiescence to Congress and the military 
command structure in Vance is a disappointing abdication. There is 
undoubtedly a delicate balance to be had when weighing civil liberties 
against matters of national security, especially in times of war. Such 
balancing has been a recurring theme in our nation’s history, from the 
Alien and Sedition Acts of 1798
205
 to the War on Terror of the 21st 
century. However, when viewing this recurring theme in hindsight, it 
is clear that the United States “has had a long and unfortunate history 
of overreacting to the perceived dangers of wartime.”
206
 Federal courts 
should be wary of this long and unfortunate trend when balancing 
constitutionally guaranteed rights against claims of military necessity 
or national security, so as not to be found on the wrong side of history. 
The Supreme Court was certainly on the wrong side of history 
regarding its treatment of Japanese-American citizens during World 
War II. In Hirabayashi v. United States,
207
 the Supreme Court upheld 
the constitutionality  of a military order imposing a curfew on all 
citizens of Japanese ancestry on the west coast, stating: 
 
Since the Constitution commits to the Executive and to 
Congress the exercise of the war power . . . it has necessarily 
given them wide scope for the exercise of judgment and 
discretion in determining the nature and extent of the 
threatened injury or danger[.] . . . Where . . . the conditions 
call for the exercise of judgment and discretion and for the 
choice of means by those branches of the Government on 
which the Constitution has placed the responsibility of 
warmaking, it is not for any court to sit in review of the 
                                                 
204
  Haig, 453 U.S. at 285-86. 
205
  Act of July 14, 1798, ch. 74, 1 Stat. 596 (criminalizing certain criticism of 
government and public officials in the aftermath of the French Revolution). 
206
  GEOFFREY R. STONE, WAR AND LIBERTY xvii (2007). 
207
  Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943). 
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A year later in the more well-known decision of Korematsu v. 
United States,
209
 the Court upheld the constitutionality  of a military 
order that compelled nearly 120,000 persons of Japanese descent to 
leave their homes for government detention camps.
210
 In doing so, the 
Court stated: 
 
[P]roperly constituted military authorities feared and invasion 
of our West Coast and felt constrained to take proper security 
measures, because they decided that the military urgency of 
the situation demanded that all citizens of Japanese ancestry 
be segregated from the West Coast temporarily, and . . . 
because Congress, reposing its confidence in this time of war 
in our military leaders—as it inevitably must—determined 
they should have the power to do just this. . . . We cannot —
by availing ourselves of the calm perspective of hindsight—




Hirabayashi and Korematsu have since been heavily derided, and 
also formally denounced by the President of the United States on two 
separate occasions.
212
 These unfortunate decisions were creatures of 
the hysteria of war, with the Court in each case deferring to the 
                                                 
208
  Id. at 93 (emphasis added). 
209
  Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944). 
210
  STONE, supra note 206, at 66. 
211
  Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 223-24. 
212
  See STONE, supra note 206, at 82-84 (citing President Ford’s Presidential 
Proclamation No. 4417 which acknowledges the evacuation and internment of loyal 
Japanese American citizens as “wrong” and a “sad day in American history,” and the 
Civil Liberties Act of 1988, signed by President Reagan, which “officially declared 
the Japanese interment a ‘grave injustice’ that was ‘carried out without adequate 
security reasons’” and “offered an official presidential apology and reparations” to 
those who had suffered as a result). 
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judgment of the “war-making” branches of government at the expense 
of our citizen’s constitutional values.  
Beyond these “constitutional pariahs,”
213
 however, there are 
shining examples of the judiciary rejecting unchecked government 
wartime powers in the name of individual liberty. During the Vietnam 
era, for example, the Supreme Court unanimously rejected the Nixon 
administration’s claim that it could lawfully wiretap American citizens 
on American soil without complying with the Fourth Amendment:   
 
Fourth Amendment freedoms cannot properly be guaranteed 
if domestic security surveillances may be conducted solely 
within the discretion of the Executive Branch. . . . The Fourth 
Amendment contemplates a prior judicial judgment, . . . [and] 
[t]his judicial role accords with our basic constitutional 
doctrine that individual freedoms will best be preserved 
through a separation of powers and division of functions 
among the difference branches and levels of Government. 
. . . We cannot accept the Government’s argument that 
internal security matters are too subtle and complex for 
judicial evaluation. Courts regularly deal with the most 
difficult issues of our society. . . . Although some added 
burden will be imposed upon the Attorney General, this 





Even in the more modern context of the “war on terror,” the 
Supreme Court has prominently sided with constitutionally guaranteed 
liberties for American citizens and rejected an expansive assertion of 
                                                 
213
  Id. at 82. 
214
  U.S. v. U.S. Dist. Court for E. Dist. of Mich., 407 U.S. 297, 316-21 
(1972) (emphasis added) (internal citations omitted). The Supreme Court similarly 
defended First Amendment rights in the Vietnam War era against claims of 
executive wartime necessity in the famous Pentagon Papers case. See N.Y. Times 
Co. v. U.S., 403 U.S. 713 (1971) (holding that the Government failed to meet its 
heavy burden of justification to impose a prior restraint on a newspaper publication 
of sensitive government materials). 
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wartime authority. In Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, the Supreme Court held that 
due process guaranteed citizens who were challenging their status as 
“enemy combatants” the right to receive notice of the basis for their 
classification and a fair opportunity to refute the classification before a 
neutral decision maker.
215
 Justice O’Connor, writing for the plurality, 
stated: 
 
Striking the proper constitutional balance here is of great 
importance to the Nation during this period of ongoing 
combat. But it is equally vital that our calculus not give short 
shrift to the values that this country holds dear or to the 
privilege that is American citizenship. It is during out most 
challenging and uncertain moments that our Nation’s 
commitment to due process is most severely tested; and it is 
in those times that we must preserve our commitment at 
home to the principles for which we fight abroad. . . . We 
have long since made clear that a state of war is not a blank 
check for the President when it comes to the rights of the 
Nation’s citizens. Whatever power the United States 
Constitution envisions for the Executive in its exchanges 
with . . . enemy organizations in times of conflict, it most 
assuredly envisions a role for all three branches when 




The above Hamdi dicta advocates a more thorough than 
deferential role for federal courts when balancing the deprivation of 
civil liberties against claims of executive war authority. By dismissing 
Vance and Ertel’s complaint, the Seventh Circuit neglected this 
responsibility.  
It is worth noting that the Seventh Circuit is not alone in doing so. 
In reaching its decision in Vance, the majority at the outset noted that 
two other circuit courts of appeals—the Fourth Circuit and D.C. 
Circuit—had recently refused to “create a right of action for damages 
                                                 
215
  Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 533 (2004). 
216
  Id. at 532-36 (emphasis added) (internal citations omitted). 
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against soldiers . . . who abusively interrogate or mistreat military 
prisoners[.]”
217
 However, the Seventh Circuit had ample opportunity 
to differentiate the facts of Vance from this nonbinding precedent.  
For example, in Lebron v. Rumsfeld, the plaintiff was an American 
citizen seeking a judicial declaration that his designation as an “enemy 
combatant” was unconstitutional, an injunction prohibiting such future 
designation, and nominal damages.
218
 Unlike in Vance, the Lebron 
plaintiff was foremost attempting to use Bivens to influence military 
policy, as opposed to obtaining redress for the wrongful acts 
committed. Moreover, Lebron raised significantly greater 
constitutional questions—challenging the President’s ability to 
designate “enemy combatants” under Congress’ Authorization for Use 
of Military Force
219
—that were not present in Vance.  
In Doe v. Rumsfeld, the plaintiff seeking Bivens relief against the 
military was technically a civilian military contractor like Vance and 
Ertel, but was detailed to a United States Marine Corps team.
220
 The 
Doe plaintiff was eminently more “quasi-military”
221
 than Vance and 
Ertel; the Doe plaintiff actually accompanied military troops on the 
ground of the Iraqi-Syrian border, obtaining military intelligence and 
diagnosing potential threats,
222
 which arguably makes the reasoning 
behind Chappell and Stanley applicable when precluding Bivens.
223
  
And, in Ali v. Rumsfeld, the plaintiffs seeking a Bivens remedy were 
Afghan and Iraqi citizens, raising unique constitutional challenges not 
                                                 
217
  Vance III, 701 F.3d 193, 195 (7th Cir. 2012) (citing Lebron v. Rumsfeld, 
670 F.3d 540 (4th Cir. 2012); Doe v. Rumsfeld, 683 F.3d 390 (D.C.Cir. 2012); Ali v. 
Rumsfeld, 649 F.3d 762 (D.C.Cir. 2011)). 
218
  Lebron, 670 F.3d at 544. 
219
  Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001). 
220
  Doe, 683 F.3d at 392. 
221
  See Vance III, 701 F.3d at 199; Auchter, supra note 11, at 23 (opining that 
Vance and Ertel were “much the same” as soldiers, or “analogous to a member of the 
military,” respectively). 
222
  Doe, 683 F.3d at 392. 
223
  See, e.g., Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296, 300 (1983) (identifying 
training for combat as a crucial element in the military structure that civilian courts 
could intrude upon and compromise). 
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 In any event, none of these cases went so far as the 
Vance majority, which “in effect creates a new absolute immunity from 






In Marbury v. Madison, Chief Justice John Marshall stated that 
“[t]he very essence of civil liberty certainly consists in the right of 
every individual to claim the protection of the laws, whenever he 
receives an injury.”
226
 In dismissing Vance and Ertel’s complaint at the 
pleading stage based on an imprecise reading of the relevant Supreme 
Court precedent, as well as an unfortunate willingness to defer to the 
war-making branches of government, the Seventh Circuit has left two 
American citizens who suffered cruel constitutional abuses at the 
hands of the military undefended. The court erred in vacating and 
reversing the well-reasoned district court and appeals panel decisions. 
While the Supreme Court has limited the availability of Bivens in new 
contexts in recent years,
227
 the doctrine has yet to be formally 
overruled. The Seventh Circuit’s expansive holding in Vance, which 
now shields “military mistreatment of civilians not only in Iraq but 
also in Illinois, Wisconsin, and Indiana,”
228
 is a disturbing jolt in the 
otherwise gradual descent of Bivens.  
 
                                                 
224
  See Vance III, 701 F.3d at 221 (Hamilton, J., dissenting) (“Other federal 
courts have faced difficult issues when alien enemy combatants have sought 
protection in civilian U.S. courts. . . . We do not need to decide those difficult issues 
in this case, which was brought not by members of al Qaeda or designated enemy 
combatants, but by U.S. citizens[.]”). 
225
  Id. (Hamilton, J., dissenting). 
226
  Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 163 (1803). 
227
  See supra Part II.E. 
228
  Vance III, 701 F.3d at 211 (Hamilton, J., dissenting). 
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